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Key Terms
Collective Bargaining Agreement – Also known as a CBA or collective
agreement. The labor contract between a union representing employees and the employer
(management) (Thomas Reuters, 2022).
Just cause – A reason that is legally acceptable or sufficient (Black’s Law
Dictionary, 2022b).
Just Culture- A culture in which front-line operators or other persons are not
punished for actions, omissions or decisions taken by them that are commensurate with
their experience and training, but in which gross negligence, willful violations and
destructive acts are not tolerated. (EU Occurrence Regulation 376/2014, Article 2, § 12)
Safety Management System – a systematic approach to managing safety, including
the necessary organizational structures, accountabilities, policies, and procedures (ICAO
SMM Doc 9859 4th edition).
Restorative justice- To restore the status and heal relationships and injuries of
victims and the wider community in the wake of an ethical breach (Dekker and Breakey,
2016).
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ABSTRACT
The US airline industry relies on the willing participation of frontline employees
to self-report safety hazards as part of an effective reporting culture. Current literature
suggests fear of punitive actions as a barrier to self-reporting. Using a quantitative
method, this study evaluated how employee protections from punitive actions
incorporated into collective bargaining agreements (CBA) of Part 121 airline employees
facilitates self-reporting. An Exploratory Factor Analysis suggests that Enhanced
Reporting, Employee Protections, Roles and Responsibility, and Employee Engagement
undergird self-reporting culture. All the factors had acceptable reliabilities and were
significantly related to each other. Regression analysis suggested that Employee
Protection was a significant predictor of Enhanced Reporting accounting for about 48%
of variances. An implication for policy is to include protections in CBAs which can
engender trust and facilitate enhanced self-reporting by employees. The study provides a
framework for airlines and unions to improve the safety reporting culture using CBA
protections.

xii

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Commercial airlines, Part 121 air carriers, rely on various labor groups with
diverse functions to conduct their mission of public air transportation. These labor
groups include pilots, flight attendants, machinists and mechanics, dispatchers,
meteorologists, ramp agents, and customer service agents. Often representing these
diverse groups are labor unions that negotiate on behalf of their respective collective
bargaining unit with management to develop a comprehensive contract called a
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) (Thomas Reuters, 2022). CBAs provide a set
of rules and policies to ensure the rights of management to manage their operations and
labor to have protections from unreasonable discipline or discharge. CBAs extensively
cover other rules and policies that include work rules, vacation, sick leave, retirement,
and incorporate regulations to ensure compliance with Title 14 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR), such as duty time and rest requirements (Black’s Law Dictionary,
2022a; Association of Flight Attendants-CWA, AFL-CIO, 2020b). CBAs are usually
negotiated months, if not years, in advance of a contract’s amendable date and are usually
in effect for years.
Since 2018, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has required US Part 121
air carriers to have a Safety Management System (SMS) (FAA, 2015). An SMS is a
systematic approach to managing safety, including the necessary organizational
1

structures, accountability, responsibilities, policies, and procedures (ICAO, 2018). There
are four pillars of SMS that include policy, safety risk management, safety assurance and
safety promotion (FAA, 2015).
Generally speaking, policy is top management’s involvement in the organizational
structure to define the procedures and develop policies to meet safety goals. Safety risk
management is the process of identifying and mitigating hazards that are either identified
in the introduction of a new process or procedure, or from the safety assurance pillar,
which includes surveillance and feedback from audits, internal evaluation programs, and
employee self-reporting of current practice of policies and procedures (FAA, 2015;
ICAO, 2018).
The implementation an effective SMS requires a robust safety culture as an
integral part of the fourth pillar of SMS, safety promotion (FAA, 2015) that can impact
the effectiveness of the self-reporting component of the safety assurance pillar. The
development of a safety culture is an informed culture that disseminates information the
system has gathered and analyzed though proactive surveillance and incidents that can
only be obtain through self-reporting (Reason, 1997).
To ensure robust self-reporting, the FAA’s implementation of SMSs has allowed
the use of the Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP), which predates SMS
implementation in aviation (FAA, 2020), to satisfy the regulatory requirement of
confidential self-reporting (FAA, 2015). Consequently, not all airlines and labor groups
of an airline chose to participate in an ASAP but must adopt an alternative method of
confidential self-reporting to meet the SMS regulatory requirement. The purpose was to
identify systemic and latent factors that could lead to fatal errors by changing from a
2

more retributive just culture to a more restorative just culture to promote self-reporting
(Stolzer and Goglia, 2015).
The ASAP was incorporated into SMS as a reliable means to incorporate
regulator, air carrier, and frontline workers (FAA, 2015; FAA, 2020). The use of ASAP
as a confidential self-reporting method is incorporated through a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) (FAA, 2020), and perhaps codified into the CBA during
negotiations between employees and management (Mills and Reiss, 2014). In the ASAP,
an Event Review Committee (ERC) comprises a representative of the airline, the labor
group or union, and the FAA who review de-identified self-reports to review the safety
aspects of the report and decide the appropriate course of action (FAA, 2020).
The main purpose of this process is to ensure safety-related information is passed
to the front-line workers without punishing those who report. The goal is to have a
process in place to identify, collate and manage safety-related hazards and associated risk
in the organization. This mechanism attempts to achieve a just culture with the three core
components of a just culture with a substantive justice of rules in place, procedural justice
which sets a process for breaches, and restorative justice by restoring the system to a
safer status (Dekker and Breakey, 2016). Potentially confounding robust reporting is the
different backgrounds and cultures of each of the diverse labor groups in their trust in
self-reporting (Reason, 1997).
Statement of the Problem
Unions are an appropriate third-party to build support and trust (Mills,
Koliba, and Reiss, 2018) in order to develop a positive safety culture and should
be included in this process from the beginning. (Stolzer and Goglia, 2015).
3

However, the diversity of labor groups, represented and not represented by a
union, may have different work cultures, perceptions, education, and
environments and therefore, each group may have a different level of bias and
perceptions of trust as it relates to confidentiality in self-reporting.
These perceptions and biases can be a deficiency that may be a barrier to
self-reporting. The confidential reporting program itself and perceptions of
potential adverse impacts of self-reporting may limit the development of a just
culture. Conversely, the nonpunitive approach of confidential self-reporting
may have allowed a sort of culture that the system can be blamed, and therefore
misuse of reporting negatively impacts a just culture.
It will be instructive to find out if the current safety management
initiatives such as SMS and components such as safety reporting programs have
adequate provisions in terms of safety accountabilities for employees assigned
operational responsibilities. It may be insightful to understand the dynamic
relationships between CBAs with just culture elements and a proactive safety
reporting culture within an SMS environment.
In the U.S, the mandate for a fully implemented SMS under 14 CFR Part 5 by
Part 121 service providers required SMS for new carriers in 2015 and a phased
implementation period for existing operating carriers to be completed by March 9, 2018
(FAA, 2015). The majority of the currently effective CBAs had been negotiated or
agreed to well before meeting the implementation requirement of Part 5 (Association of
Flight Attendants, 2022). However, some of these CBAs did not incorporate voluntary
reporting within a non-punitive paradigm under SMS implementation that can positively
4

impact work rules and offer protections such as duty time and rest requirements
(Association of Flight Attendants, 2022; Flight Time/Duty Time Seminar, 2016).
Incorporating language in CBAs that pertains to non-punitive safety reporting within a
just culture environment to ensure trust in safety reporting systems is worth researching
due to the potential for enhanced propensity to self-report safety issues by employees.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to assess the factors that underly an effective selfreporting culture among Part 121 service providers in the U.S. Another objective of the
study was to assess the perceptions of respondents on incorporating clauses that ensures
employee protections such as non-retribution and non-punitive actions for self -reporting
safety events in collective bargaining agreements among U.S Part 121 airlines and the
effects on self-reporting culture. The perceptions of a cross-section of Part 121 airline
personnel representing the different functional labor groups (pilots, cabin crew,
maintenance) were sampled using a quantitative survey instrument and differences in
perceptions of these respondents on factors underlying survey instrument items were
assessed for significance.
Creswell and Creswell (2018) states that “a survey design provides a quantitative
description of trends, attitudes, and opinions of a population, or tests for associations
among variables of a population,” (p. 147). The rationale to use the quantitative research
method using a survey design is well known in the social sciences, and through
inferential statistics, a representation of the sentiment of the population of airline
employees on safety and reporting can be attained.

5

Research Questions
To achieve the research objectives, the following research questions were
developed to explore the research problem:
1. What are the factors underlying the dimension self-reporting culture among
respondents in Part 121 airlines in the U.S?
2. What are the strengths of the relationship between the factors underlying selfreporting culture and how do codifying employee protections affect enhanced
reporting in Part 121 airlines?
3. What are the variations in the mean scores of perceptions of the factors by
functional groups, Union and non-Union participation, and Reporting types,
Non-ASAP vs ASAP?

6

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Defining Safety Culture in Safety Management Systems
Reason (1997) defines safety culture as shared values within an organization that
have seven main components or elements:
1) As a system with the goal or drive to achieve maximum safety.
2) The safety system has respect for those things that can harm it.
3) To have an informed culture with data to promote knowledge of the wellness
of the system.
4) A reporting culture of safety infractions that has front line workers who are
willing to participate.
5) Trust through a restorative culture rather than a punitive one.
6) A flexible culture with adaptability and is prepared for crises.
7) A learning culture that will learn from the system to change as needed.
These shared values can be different in each labor group within an organization as a
safety culture has many different components (pp. 195-196).
The environment where SMS is applied comprises of four subcultures that include
a flexible, learning, reporting, and just cultures that Reason (1997) says interact to create
an informed culture (p. 196). Figure 1 outlines the theoretical structure of a safety
culture.
7

Figure 1
Five Components that make up a Safety Culture (FAA, 2016)

Gerde (2015) identified significant challenges to SMS implementation that
primarily focused on the cultural transformations that could lead to a potentially poor
safety culture. Stoltzer and Goglia (2015) discuss the dynamics of implementing a safety
culture in SMS:
“One of the most challenging elements of SMS is the creation and nurturing of a
safety culture,…A safety culture begins at the top of the organization, with the
incorporation of policies and procedures that cultivate a reporting culture (where
structures are in place that allows safety-related information to flow from all
levels of the organization into a system empowered to correct problems) and a
just culture (in which individuals are both held accountable for their actions and
treated fairly by the organization). (p. 50).
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A voluntary reporting culture is imperative to the constant improvement cycle of
increased safety, and labor relies on its proper functioning and information to increase
productivity while also improving safety. Mills and Reiss (2014) state:
“Voluntary disclosure programs generate information and insights about the usual
practices of the industry, the division of labor, typical problems, and ways to
handle them – those details often invisible to those outside an organization or
inside the organization but known by those “on the ground.” (p. 403).
The voluntary reporting system and culture gives voice to the frontline employees that
can provide valuable data that is required by SMS for continuous improvement (Gerde,
2015; Liao, 2015, and Jausan, et al., 2017). Under and Gerde (2021) state:
“If disciplinary system practices in an organization causes such an unfair
perception of unfairness, employees’ fear and worries concerning reporting will
increase and the weak positive just culture will force them into silence” (p. 11).
Dekker and Breakey (2016) point to three forms of justice which comprise a just
culture as substantive justice, procedural justice, and restorative justice. Substantive
justice is derived from the fairness of the rules and has to do with their content.
Procedural justice is much like a court system, the processes to facilitate a remedy when a
rule has been violated, protect the violator with a just result, and the mechanism to
delegate who has authority to make determinations.
Restorative justice is restoring the stakeholders to a state of safety or healing,
even second and third-party participants. The reporting mechanisms in ASAP or other
approved reporting system has the purpose of incorporating these three components into
the SMS and just cultures (Dekker and Breakey, 2016).
9

A “Just culture promotes a sense of shared organizational responsibility for safety
hazards and, thus, honest communication about at-risk behavior resulting from systemic
weaknesses” (Dekker, 2014: as cited in, Darveaua, and Hannon, 2017). In particular, the
goal of this research is to understand the inter-relationships between a reporting culture
and just culture within Part 121 operations. It will be insightful to assess how the
incorporation of verbiage on employee protections from punitive actions for selfreporting inadvertent mistakes, errors and potential violations in a CBA can facilitate
trust and enhance self-reporting propensity.
Precepts of a Just Culture
Schubert (2004) attributes the genesis of aviation’s movement to a just culture as
recognition of legal barriers in creating a safety culture, and the balance of the various
interests in an acceptable manner to participation, and states, “Overcoming legal barriers
to safety will often depend less on the formulation of the law, than in the way the law is
applied” (p. 63). This means that the application of the law will be the determinant on
the various interests and their level of participation.
Dekker (2011) reviewed the criminalization of human error in aviation and
healthcare and found that fear of criminalization negatively impacted voluntary reporting.
These legal issues have implications that impact individual trust. Pellegrino (2013)
illustrates the trust issue as it relates to State implementation:
“The EU and its Member States are not currently set up to use the widest possible
range of data to prevent accidents and to address the risks to aviation safety in a
systematic manner. This situation is caused by a number of factors, not the least
of which is a general lack of trust for reporting occurrences.” (p. 478)
10

Even though Pellegrino and Schubert predate mandatory SMS application in US aviation,
they are contemporary to the ASAP. The legal distinction in the application of the law
has to do with the differences between the legalities of negligence and willful negligence
as well as willful misconduct and recklessness.
Lawrenson and Braithwaite (2018) evaluated various strategies in which safety
management can address the legal standards as it applies to safety culture, perhaps as a
legal construct or concept within SMS itself. Lawrenson and Braithwaite (2018)
“Safety culture would appear to be developing not just as a mechanism to
manage safety-related values and attitudes within organisations, but also as a
legal concept that associates accidents with corporate criminal liability “(p. 260).
Even though the SMS is an internal process, in the face of legal liability, there has been
an emergence of criminalization of corporate behavior and the SMS’ safety culture needs
to consider aspects of evolving public sentiment, especially since aviation has achieved a
high level of safety (Lawrenson and Braithwaite, 2018).
Despite this higher level of safety, the consumer perception still is favorable for
criminalization unless pilots were determined to not be at fault (Winter, et. al, 2020),
potentially making voluntary disclosure retributive in courts. Kováčová et al (2019)
provide an 11-step process to a just culture that includes a just culture working group
periodically meeting with investigators, court and law authorities, and aviation
stakeholders on how to protect safety data and the system of reporting.
In an ASAP, if it is determined that the employee who volunteered in the program
by self-reporting engaged in willful misconduct, regulatory noncompliance or include the
“Big Five” of criminal activity, controlled substances or substance abuse, intentional
11

falsification, or alcohol, the immunity of the self-report is lost, and the report is referred
to the FAA for remedy (FAA, 2020).
This is markedly different than the application of SMS in the health industry
which distinguishes three distinct behaviors or the level of intentions, one of which
creates a distinguishable gray area for interpretation, “at-risk” behavior, in aviation.
Harvey and Sotardi (2017), identify the three levels of intentions in the area of health as
being human error as being unintentional, at-risk behavior as unrecognizable or
justifiable breaches in policy or procedures, and recklessness as being, intentional
disregard for “substantial and unjustifiable risk” (p. 1240).
Perhaps as litigation and criminalization makes corporations or systems within
corporations liable (Lawrenson & Braithwaite 2018); ERC’s may refer more reports for
action making remedies sought for employee protection a required attribute of SMS.
Since most union members must vote to ratify contracts and participate in the process
there would be more ownership in the substantive justice aspect to include self-reporting
in CBA’s (Dekker & Breakey, 2016). Legislation in some states eliminates the concept
of malicious intent leaving accidents and negligence in the bounds of criminal law
(Hurley & Berghahn, 2010). It is the at-risk behavior that is deemed “willful
misconduct” or regulatory noncompliance that begs the question and leaves a CBA
remedy wanting.
Overcoming Barriers to Voluntary Reporting
Despite Schubert (2004) legal barriers to a just culture, latent to an individual’s
apprehension of participation in self-reporting due to fear of being punished, it is
Pellegrino’s view, “spontaneous reporting is considered to be a means of ensuring the
12

application of the principle of 'just culture' in an atmosphere of complete trust without the
fear of being punished” (Pellegrino, 2013, p. 477) that requires execution. Not only is
trust an issue, but cultural differences impact perceptions and attitudes in reporting,
learning and just cultures (Liao, 2015).
Under and Gerde (2021) developed a tool to measure different forms of silence as
reasons for maintenance personnel for not reporting. Findings suggest that relational and
prosocial silence, the fear of negatively impacting relationships within the working
environment, was the number one factor for not reporting. However, the highest load for
a variable item measured in the study was a just culture that was weak (Under and Gerde,
2021).
Current research findings by Under and Gerde (2021) supports earlier ones by
Darveaua and Hannon (2017) who did an extensive qualitative literature review to
identify various barriers to voluntary reporting in various industries including aviation.
The results of the research indicated trust in the reporting system and trust in
management as major barriers to reporting, among seven other reasons that include more
local perceptions of training and attitude. The findings suggest significant differences in
the perceptions of study constructs among machinists and mechanics. The facilitators to
reporting identified by Darveaua, and Hannon (2017) include providing more training in
the reporting systems themselves.
Afaya and Konlan (2021) identified three barriers including individual,
professional, and organizational barriers to voluntary reporting in the health industry. A
review of 14 studies revealed that fear of lawsuits, management behavior such as
retribution, and inadequate reporting systems were the main barriers to reporting. For the
13

airline industry, a 2004 study found that although all occupational groups of an airline
needed to improve safety culture that there were differences in cultures between each
group (Gilla and Shergill, 2004).
Gao, et al., (2015) suggest that working experience has a significant effect on
safety attitudes towards reporting and safety climate perceptions can be different across
different occupational groups and attribute the variance to a possible influence of subcultures within each group. In a cross-sectional survey of the various functional groups
within Taiwan’s Ministry of Defence Aviation Division, Wang (2018) found out
significant differences in perceptions of safety reporting culture. Wang (2018) further
states that “Nevertheless, all responders (pilots and GSS) believed that safety culture in
their organizations is a reporting culture” (p. 110), ground personnel (GSS) had a more
favorable perception on safety reporting culture than the Air Force and Army pilots.
Liao (2015) in a study of how differences in national culture impacts safety
reporting in an airline, suggested that pilots from western cultural background had a more
favorable view of safety reporting as compared to their Chinese colleagues with the
Chinese pilots being more fearful of retribution. Within-group evaluation of safety
climate looking at effects of rank and company experience for an Asia-Pacific airline by
Gao et al. (2013) showed that there was a difference in self-reporting by pilots based on
experience.
The overall result of the analyses found younger pilots were less likely to report
than to share safety concerns with a supervisor and tended to view the safety themes of
their airline as for more positive than senior pilots (Gao, et al., 2013). These differences
between the various labor groups within an airline, the method of reporting, union
14

participation and CBA protections need to be assessed, as to further understand safety
performance and SMS in 14 CFR Part 121 airlines as suggested by Adjekum (2017).
Union Aspects of Safety Culture
Collective bargaining agreements outline both management’s and the union’s
responsibilities and rights, including employee working conditions, wages, and hours
(Thomas Reuters, 2022). CBAs include worker protections from actions by management
that violates the CBA, such as safety related issues or workplace violations. The CBA
delineates the grievance and arbitration procedures to addresses those violations as well
as to provide due process from discipline for actions committed by the employee that
management deems is a violation (Thomas Reuters, 2022).
The history of collective bargaining agreements in aviation dates back to 1919
pilot protests over the Post Office insistence that mail is transported in poor weather
conditions and was later formally organized in 1920, 1926, and 1930 as the Air Mail
Pilots of America, National Pilots’ Association, and the Air Line Pilots Association
(ALPA) (Northrup, 1947). ALPA desired the labor protections of the arbitration
procedure afforded under the Railway Labor Act that were extended to airlines in
legislation in 1936 and the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (Northrup, 1947). Currently,
ALPA represents pilots of some 38 airlines (Air Line Pilots Association [ALPA], n.d.).
The same year of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 was passed, machinists began
to unionize. At the time, it was made up of machinists and engineers that worked on the
railroad but eventually migrated into a more industrial type of labor union with less
engineers and today, with over 800,000 members, it is known as the International
Association of Machinists (Georgia State University, 2019).
15

The Transportation Workers Union established an aviation division in the 1940’s
to form unions for Pan American and Eastern Airlines. The union comprises of ground
handlers, ramp workers, airline mechanics and flight attendants (Transport Workers
Union of America, AFL-CIO, 2022). The first flight attendant union was established in
1945 in the United States as the Air Line Stewardesses Association, now is the
Association of Flight Attendants (Association of Flight Attendants-CWA - AFA United
MEC, 2022).
All labor groups serving in the airline industry have unions, but not all labor
groups of a company have union contracts or union representation (Chaison, 2007).
“Union density reached 47.5% in 2004 and has been consistently above the overall
private sector rate—usually four or five times that rate” (Chaison, 2007, p. 644).
However, unionization may be much higher with an estimate of nearly 69 percent (Gittell
et al., 2006).
There is very little in the public domain regarding the contents of each airline
CBA. However, the best-documented CBAs within the public domain include the
Association of Flight Attendants-CWA, AFL-CIO (Association of Flight AttendantsCWA [AFA], n.d.). A comparison of contracts within the AFA-CWA indicated that
except for the Alaska Airlines contract, there are no provisions of protection for voluntary
self-reporting, (ourcontract.org, 2022). The Association of Flight Attendants-CWA,
AFL-CIO (2021) Alaska Airlines’ contract states for management serving as a flight
attendant the protection of reporting under ASAP:
“4. No single-source discipline may result from the Inflight management
employee’s presence on the sequence. Safety issues will be eligible for
16

submission under the Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP). If either party
does not participate in the ASAP program, the Company and the Association
will meet and agree to an equivalent alternative process.”
For an airline to take disciplinary or punitive action against an employee, just cause for
such discipline has to exist for the disciplinary action to stand.
In 1964, Arbitrator Carroll Daugherty produced a list of seven questions that
comprise just cause. Requirements of just cause include fair notice or prior
communication of the rules and penalties, reasonableness of the discipline especially
when considering prior enforcement, due process in the form of fair investigations,
substantial proof with credible evidence, evenhanded treatment or equal treatment
ensuring that employees that commit the same offense get the same treatment, and
proportional penalties in a progressive discipline that considers a seventh element of
mitigating or aggravating circumstances (Schwartz, 2013). Each of these elements of just
cause need not be individually stated in a CBA, but the protections of voluntary selfreporting should be, with each of these elements inherent and just as fundamental to the
contract as the work rules.
Mills, Koliba, and Reiss (2018) identify unions as the appropriate third-party to
help facilitate industry accountability, “In our case, the presence of employee unions in
one voluntary program helps prevent the industry from engaging in large-scale regulatory
deception while also helping prevent regulators from using self-disclosed data in punitive
actions against employees and air carriers” (p. 1480). Further, Mills, Koliba, and Reiss
(2018) describes their inclusion of labor and employees in the voluntary reporting,
particularly the safety data process as “Involving employees and their unions in the
17

analysis of safety data can help to mitigate potential incidents while also utilizing the
expertise of employees (professional accountability)” (p. 1503).
The perceptions of frontline workers within a safety culture facilitate a reporting
and just culture that being codified to a collective bargaining agreement may improve
that culture. The definition of “at-risk” behavior looms upon a determination by the
Event Review Committee (ERC) of the ASAP report being referred for investigation as
willful misconduct or regulatory noncompliance and nothing prohibits an air carrier from
taking its actions to discipline and discharge despite this determination (FAA, 2020).
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
A quantitative research method with a cross-sectional approach using a survey
instrument was used in this study. The survey instrument was divided into a three-parts.
The survey items were developed from a review of previously validated questionnaires
(Gao, et al., 2013; Gao, et al., 2015), and SMS training documents (TSI, 2022). Initially,
a list of potential survey items was collated and given to an SMS subject matter expert
who reviewed and provided initial face/content validity of survey items. A final list of
survey instrument items was obtained for the study.
The research was reviewed and approved by the University of North Dakota’s
Institutional Review Board (IRB) on March 9, 2022. The anonymous survey instrument
was deployed online through a third party (SurveyMonkey.com) to facilitate the response
of Part 121 airline employees representing the various functional labor groups of pilots,
flight attendants, machinists and mechanics, ramp agents, flight planning, management,
and airport customer service. The anonymous survey link was posted online between
March 10 and March 26, 2022, via a Facebook post on a social media page and was
promoted via Facebook’s post boost. A link to the anonymous survey was also sent via
emails to numerous airline employees facilitated by known contact persons at various
airlines during the same period.
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Part one of the survey included consent and the independent variables including
job role, years of experience, self-reporting methods, employment status, and union
participation. To facilitate response, no demographic information such as gender, age,
race, or airline affiliation were gathered. Other than facilitating the completion of the
survey, a determination was made that there was no basis in this research to gather
demographics.
Part Two comprised of 15 statements that required respondents to rate how much
they agreed or disagreed with the statements (Appendix A). These items are unforced
Likert-style rankings on a five-point scale rating from ‘strongly disagree to ‘strongly
agree’ with the statements to ascertain attitude on safety culture, reporting culture, and
their CBA’s language for reporting protections. Two of the 15 statements (Table 1)
required respondents to rate how much they agree or disagree with the statement to
determine their view of current CBAs or other employment contract language and the
impact of adding language to CBAs or employment contracts on self-reporting.
Part two statements representing themes associated with culture (Figure 1) and
perceptions of CBAs were included in analyses as dependent variables. Part Three
include the open-ended qualitative questions with comment boxes and one general
comments box for feedback. There were 23 questions in the survey instrument and the
complete survey is provided in Appendix C.
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Table 1
Survey Questions Regarding CBA Language
Question
20. My employment contract (union, third party, or nonunion agreement) ensures
protection from punitive action for self-reporting safety violations or unsafe
conditions.
21. If language were included in my employment contract providing protections for
self-reporting of safety violations it would improve reporting of safety violations or
incidents?

Preliminary Data Analysis and Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA)
At the end of the survey period, a total of 149 survey responses were collected
through surveymonkey.com. Incomplete surveys and surveys with responses that were
consider spurious were removed. Spurious responses include responses that were
completed in a time that would preclude thoughtful participation (t < 1 min), that had the
same response for all questions (e.g., all 5’s), and ones where comments were made that
represented irritability or disdain for the survey in combination of other reasons. The
total number of remaining survey participants (n = 116) were used for the remaining
analyses. An apriori statistical significance level of 0.50 (2-tail) was used in all analyses
unless otherwise stated.
Statistical analyses were performed using SPSS Statistics 26 by IBM®. Analysis
of the statistics were performed to evaluate whether the final dataset had normality to
preclude any bias. Exploratory Factor Analyses (EFA) were performed to identify the
factors underlying the dimension reporting culture among respondents. The goal of EFA
is to reduce the variables through “dimension reduction” and understand the correlation
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pattern matrix of items that explains reporting culture (Warner, 2008; Fields, 2018).
Reliability analyses were conducted to evaluate if the survey items under each of the
identified explanatory factors (variables) are consistent.
Correlation analysis was performed to evaluate the strengths of the relationship
between the factors underlying reporting culture, as well as to evaluate the effect of years
of experience on the factors identified through EFA. Regression analysis was conducted
to determine if the hypothesized predictive relationship between the factor that has items
on employee protections such as CBA language and the factor that had items related to
trust and willingness to self-reporting was statistically significant. The regression analysis
also provided an assessment of the strength of relationship between these factors and
determined how CBA language impacts self-reporting.
An independent T-test of means was performed to determine if there is any
significance on the factors in terms of perceptions of respondents based on their union
involvement (unionized verses non-unionized) and if reporting type had any significance
on the factors identified in EFA. A two-by-two factorial ANOVA was performed to
analyze if there were main effects and potential interaction effects from union and nonunion and ASAP and non-ASAP reporting methods on the factors identified in EFA. An
ANOVA was done to evaluate the different perceptions of the factors by the functional
labor group variable.
Open-ended questions were added to the survey instrument as part of the survey
instrument to collect responses that will provide descriptive context and further amplify
the quantitative data. The qualitative questions elicited responses on suggested text
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related to employee protections to be incorporated into a CBA and strategies to improve
labor-management relationships.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
As stated earlier, there were one-hundred and sixteen (n=116) responses from
emails sent out and social media promotions which had the anonymous link to the survey.
Union members represented 83.6% of the sample population and 96.6% are currently
employed fulltime or part-time while the remainder are either retired or furloughed. The
mean airline experience of respondents is 12.5 years (SD= 8.2).
A normal distribution was assumed for all the data set even though a visual
inspection of the histogram and descriptive statistics revealed that the skewness and the
kurtosis values for two variables (Union participation and Reporting Type) were above
the recommended +/- 1 (Fields, 2018). A robust approach using bootstrapping was used
in subsequent analyses to minimize any potential violations of normality. Table 2 shows a
summary of the descriptive statistics and Table 3 gives a statistical summary of the
breakdown of the respondents’ job duties.
Factors Underlying the Dimension Reporting Culture
An Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) was done using Principal Axis Factoring
(PAF) as the extraction method with Oblimin-Kaiser normalization rotation showing
coefficients of .3 and Kaiser criterion of Eigenvalue of 1 to evaluate survey items 7
through 21. A review of the pattern matrix revealed four factors and was confirmed by
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Table 2
Descriptive Analysis Summary

Measures
Airline Experience
(years)
Union Participation
Union Members
Non-Union Members
Reporting Type
ASAP
Non-ASAP
* Out of a scale of 1-4.

N

Mean

SD

Minimum

Maximum

Skewness

Kurtosis

115
116
97
19
116
89
27

12.5
1.16
1.55*
-

8.2
.372
1.05
-

1
1
1
-

32
2
4
-

.410
1.841
1.63
-

-.833
1.413
1.38
-

Table 3
Summary of Roles Completing the Survey

Labor Group

Frequency
80
1
7
13
3
10
4
2

Pilots
Dispatcher/Meteorologist
Airport Customer Service
Flight Attendant
Maintenance
Ramp Agent
Management
Other

Percent
69%
0.9%
6.0%
11.2%
2.6%
8.6%
3.5%
1.7%

scree plot leveling (Appendix B) after the four factors. Bartlett’s test of sphericity was χ2
(91) = 694.22, p < 0.001 with Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO = .85). The four factors
revealed explained 66.2% of the variance.
In the first iteration of the EFA, Item 19, “confidence to file an ASAP or nonASAP without fear” cross-loaded under both enhanced reporting (factor 1) and employee
protections. An EFA was performed without Item 19 resulting in four factors grouped as
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Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7. The four factors were Enhanced Reporting, Roles and
Responsibility, Employee Protections and Employee Engagement. Reliability analyses
were conducted to evaluate each of the factors represented as Tables 4 -7. Each factor
resulted in Cronbach’s alphas of .83, .80, .74, and .65, respectively. The reliability
results are included in each of the Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7. Interestingly the item related to
adding CBA language failed to load on any of the four factors. Table 8 is a summary of
the averaged safety reporting culture underlying factors produced by EFA and used for
further analyses.
Table 4
Factor 1: Enhanced Reporting
N

Mean

SD

116

3.23

1.24

16. There is trust between management/supervisors and employees 116

2.88

1.17

18. Management encourages reporting of incidents or safety
concerns even if there are adverse consequences

3.71

0.99

15. Managers/Supervisors promote safety by leading by example

116

Cronbach’s alpha = .83

Table 5
Factor 2: Roles and Responsibilities

N

Mean

SD

7. Everyone understands their role in safety

116

3.83

1.13

8. Everyone is accountable for their safety responsibilities

116

3.94

1.09

9. Employees are properly trained for their position

115

3.68

1.11

Cronbach’s alpha = .80
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Table 6
Factor 3: Employee Protections
N

Mean

SD

10. There are punitive actions by management for
self-reporting safety issues

116

3.72

1.21

14. There is a system in place whereby staff can report
incidents anonymously

116

3.80

1.14

116

3.85

0.93

19. I feel confident that I can file an ASAP or other voluntary
safety report without fear of punitive action by management.

116

4.00

1.07

20. My employment contract (union, third party, or nonunion
agreement) ensures protection from punitive action for selfreporting safety violations or unsafe conditions

115

3.91

1.10

N

Mean

SD

11. There are consequences for intentional violations

116

4.03

1.04

12. People report conditions that exist for an accident to occur

116

3.60

0.88

13. There is clear evidence that employees have a voice in
safety

116

3.49

1.20

17. Our self-reporting policy of safety violations is nonpunitive

Cronbach’s alpha = .74

Table 7
Factor 4: Employee Engagement

Cronbach’s alpha = .65
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Table 8
Summary of Averaged Factors
N

Mean

SD

Enhanced Reporting

116

3.27

0.98

Roles and Responsibilities

116

3.82

0.94

Employee Protections

116

3.86

0.83

Employee Engagement

116

3.71

0.80

Strengths of the relationship between the factors underlying reporting culture
A correlation analysis was conducted to evaluate the relationship between the
four factors and the years of experience. The results showed significance between
experience and employee protections (r = .212, p < .05). The results were significant
between the four factors determined by EFA and the results are included in Table 9.
Table 9
Correlation Summary Table: Four Factors and Experience
Measures

N

Mean

SD

1

2

3

1. Experience

115

12.5

8.21

-

2. Enhanced Reporting

116

3.27

.98

.097

-

3. Roles and Responsibilities

116

3.82

.94

-.03

.487**

4. Employee Protections

116

3.86

.83

.212*

.689** .395**

5. Employee Engagement

116

3.71

.80

-.122

.585** .544**

4

-

.497**

* Indicates significance of p < 0.05; ** Indicates significance of p < 0.01
r statistics are shown in the diagonal

Two factors that best represented the reporting culture dimension and CBA
protections were employee protections and enhanced reporting. A simple regression
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analysis was done using a bootstrap sample of 1000 to determine whether employee
protections is a significant predictor of enhanced reporting. The result indicates a
significant predictive relationship between employee protections and enhanced reporting
(F (1,114) = 102.99, R2 = .475, p < .001). Table 10 shows the results of the regression
analysis.
Table 10
Model Summary Between Employee Protections and Enhanced Reporting

Regression Weights
EP → ER

Standardized Beta
Coefficient

R2

.689

.48

F
102.99

p-value
.000

The R2, which is a measure of the effect size, indicates that employee protections
accounts for nearly 48% of enhanced reporting and suggest that any variations in items
that measure employee protections could significantly affect enhanced reporting. The
standardized beta coefficient indicates that for every unit increase in enhanced employee
protection, there would be a corresponding .689 increase in enhanced reporting. It is
instructive to note that the employee protection factor has an item on CBA protection and
self-reporting and these results suggest that it is significantly predictive of items such as
trust and propensity to self-report safety issues which are items under enhanced reporting.
Table 11 shows the results of the bootstrap analysis.
A multiple regression was performed to determine if the inclusion of the other
factors underlying reporting culture will be predictive of enhanced reporting and improve
the model. Even though there were model significance and all the other factors also had
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significant coefficients, incorporating the other two factors had minimal impact on model
goodness-of-fit and overall effect size. The analysis was also not relevant in answering
the key research question 2.
Table 11
Bootstrap for Coefficients

Model
1

Sig (2St. Error Tailed)

Bootstrapa
95% Confidence Interval
Lower
Upper

B

Bias

(Constant)

.132

.006

.268

.621

-.409

.649

Employee_Protections

.815

-.002

.068

.001

.685

.947

a. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 1000 bootstrap samples
However, the standardized beta value for the employee protection predictor was
reduced to 0.504 and suggest the contribution of the other factors to the model reduced
the contribution of enhanced protection to the variance observed in enhanced reporting.
It also suggests that when all the other factors were kept constant, enhanced protections
increases by 0.50 for every unit increase of enhanced reporting. Results are reported in
Table 12.
Table 12
Coefficientsa
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Std.
B
Error

Model
1

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta

t

Sig.

95% Confidence
Interval for B
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound

-2.248

.027

-1.450

-.091

(Constant)

-.771

.343

Roles_Responsibilities

.158

.078

.151

2.015

.046

.003

.313

Employee_Protections

.596

.086

.504

6.938

.000

.426

.766

Employee_Engagement

.308

.097

.252

3.164

.002

.115

.501

a. Dependent Variable: Enhanced_Reporting1
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Perceptions of Union and Non-Union Participation and Reporting Type
An Independent sample t-tests were performed to evaluate the relationship
between the union and non-union groups with the four factors from EFA. There was a
statistical significance between union and non-union groups perceptions on employee
protections (t (28.10) = 2.88, p < .05). There was no statistical difference between union
and non-union groups with enhanced reporting (t (114) = .133, p > .05), roles and
responsibilities (t (114) = 2.38, p >.05), and employee engagement (t (114) = 1.09, p >
.05). The results are summarized in Table 13.
Table 13
Results of Union Participation on Four Factors
Parameter
Enhanced Reporting
Roles and Responsibilities
Employee Protections
Employee Engagement

Union
M
SD
3.28
.96
3.82
.95
3.94
.82
3.75
.81

non-Union
M
SD
3.25
1.11
3.77
.88
3.41
.72
3.53
.72

t (114)
0.133
.238
2.88
1.09

p
.895
.812
.008
.277

Independent sample t-tests were performed to evaluate if ASAP and non-ASAP
reporting types influenced the perceptions on the four factors determined by EFA. The
results show significance of ASAP and Non-ASAP reporting types on all four factors of
enhanced reporting (t (37.38) = 3.51, p < .05), roles and responsibilities (t (41.14) = 3.09,
p < .05), employee protections (t (37.65) = 7.10, p < .05), and employee engagement (t
(36.42) = 3.08, p < .05). Results are summarized in Table 14.
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Table 14
Results of Reporting Type on Four Factors
Parameter
Enhanced Reporting
Roles and Responsibilities
Employee Protections
Employee Engagement

ASAP
M
SD
3.46
.88
3.97
.89
4.12
.64
3.84
.72

non-ASAP
M
SD
2.67
1.07
3.33
.94
2.97
.77
3.26
.91

t (114)
3.51
3.09
7.10
3.08

p
.001
.004
.000
.004

A 2x2 between subjects factorial ANOVA was performed to evaluate reporting
methods (ASAP and Non-ASAP) and union membership on the four factors of enhanced
reporting, roles and responsibilities, employee protections, and employee engagement.
The result of the 2x2 factorial ANOVA showed significance main effect for enhanced
reporting (F (1, 112) = 4.49, p < .05). There was no statistical significance of the other
three factors role and responsibilities (F (1, 112) = .79, p > .05), employee protections (F
(1, 112) = 2.48, p > .05), and employee engagement (F (1, 112) = .12, p > .05).
Perceptions Between Various Functional Labor Groups
A one-way ANOVA analysis was performed to analyze the factors between the
various functional labor groups. The functional group, flight planning, had less than two
responses and was removed from the ANOVA in order to conduct Tukey post hoc
analysis. There was a statistical significance between the functional labor groups for
enhanced reporting [F (5, 109) = 2.69, p = .025], employee protections [ (F (5, 109) =
11.22, p = .000)], and employee engagement [ (F (5, 109) = 4.57, p = .001)].
A post hoc test using the Tukey method was performed and identified significance
in enhanced reporting between flight attendants and pilots (p = .012). Post hoc tests
using the Tukey method were also performed and identified significance between pilot
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and other (p = .021) for employee engagement. Post hoc tests showed significance
between pilots and ACS (p = .040), pilots and flight attendants (p = .000), and pilots and
ramp agents (p = .006) for employee protections.
Qualitative Open-Ended Questions
There were some open-ended questions as part of the survey instrument to collect
responses that will provide descriptive context and further amplify the quantitative data.
The qualitative questions elicited responses on suggested text related to employee
protections to be incorporated into a CBA and strategies to improve labor-management
relationships. Twenty-nine (29) of the 116 respondents of the survey, or 25% of those
surveyed provided a response on suggested verbiage.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
Extant literature suggests a relationship between employee protection and selfreporting culture in various organizations. An objective of the study was to understand
the relationships between hypothesized factors that underly self-reporting culture in Part
121 airline operations. The study also hypothesized that adding protection clauses in
CBAs that ensure non-punitive action for self-reporting safety issues by employees can
enhance self-reporting propensity. An EFA confirmed four factors as explanatory
constructs underlying self-reporting culture.
The factors were enhanced reporting, roles and responsibilities, employee
protections, and employee engagement. All the factors had relatively good factor
loadings and the items’ reliability for three of the factors was good ( α>0.70) and one of
them had an alpha value of 0.65 which though low was acceptable. The results suggest
that the survey instrument was psychometrically valid and reliable. Assessing the strength
of the relationships between the factors underlying self-reporting culture and the variable
working experience. All the factors were also significantly related to each other, and they
all had high effect sizes further confirming their role as underlying factors of selfreporting culture.
There was a significant relationship between working experience and employee
protection. The trend suggested that as working experiences increased perceptions of the
34

merits of having employee protections increased. This finding is similar to an earlier
study by Gao (2013) which suggested that younger and less experienced pilots in an
airline had relatively lower perceptions of protections offered to employees for reporting
safety issues and did not report using the voluntary self-reporting tools available but
would rather communicate with a member of the management directly. An implication
for policy is to ensure that employee protections afforded by a self-reporting program are
explained and communicated effectively to less experienced employees as part of
indoctrination training and advocating support from senior colleagues and management.
There was statistical significance in terms of the linear relationships between the
four factors, indicating that improvement in enhanced reporting could result from any
improvement in one of the other three factors. This study found a significant predictive
relationship between employee protections and enhanced reporting. This is instructive to
Part 121 providers, in that the improvement in policy regarding employee protections
should be a focus to improve enhanced reporting culture. The variable with the least
mean (M=2.88) was that of trust, which loaded with enhanced reporting, suggests that the
formulation of employee protections as part of any self-reporting program must have
clauses that engender trust between employees and management to enhance
effectiveness.
A policy implication is for Part 121 providers to focus on promoting employee
protections by incorporating a memorandum of understanding on non-punitive selfreporting of safety events in CBAs and also improved training of younger or less
experienced airline employees who may not feel confident in reporting. It may even be
more instructive if such employee protections are codified intrinsically as part of the
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CBAs for greater effect on enhanced reporting based on the predictive relationship that
suggests commensurate improvement in employee protections may drive enhanced
reporting.
The variations in the perceptions of the factors by functional groups, union
participation, and reporting types revealed that there was significance between the
different functional labor groups, which reporting type was significant in all four factors,
and that union participation was significant with employee protections. What these
analyses reveal is the differences in perceptions of the factors between pilots and the
other labor groups more broadly.
There was significance between pilots and at least one labor group for each of the
factors of enhanced reporting, employee engagement, and employee protections. There
was no significance between the other labor groups whatsoever. There could be varying
reasons for these results, however, the result of differences in the demographic variables;
reporting type, ASAP and non-ASAP, and union participation seem to highlight more
favorable perceptions of the factors by pilot respondents as compared to the other labor
groups.
A plausible rationale for this observation may be due to the incorporation of the
ASAP into the pilot work rules dating back to the early 1990s and the protections
afforded by ASAP for pilots in terms of self-reporting of safety issues in a just culture
environment are evident (FAA, 2020). For all the other labor groups, the use of an
ASAP-style reporting program may be relatively new, and the inured benefits of
protections for self-reporting may not significantly influence their perceptions.
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Another plausible reason is that pilot groups may be more unionized and
codifying employee protections under CBAs may be much easier to implement than nonunionized employee groups. This is further corroborated by the result that suggests that
employees who participated in union or had union membership significantly perceived
the merits of employee protection better than non-unionized employees. This could also
be due to the likelihood of unions advocating and fighting to ensure administrative and
restorative justice for members.
As part of the open-ended questions to provide context and further amplify the
quantitative data. Some respondent suggested improvements to CBAs by including
procedural items such as a first response method that require review by a union
representative or trusted cohort of the same labor group prior to submission, outlining
who has access to reports, and the method of de-identification.
Some technical suggestions included ensuring that aircraft flight data such as
Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) type data are also afforded the same
protections from recrimination and punitive actions. Some respondents also
recommended that direct reports to supervisors and top-level management be treated with
the same anonymity and protection. Some suggestions related to punitive and legal
processes related to the monitoring of the reporting employee to ensure protection from
retaliation.
Other suggestions touched on the need for transparent grievance procedures and
disciplinary processes. Ensuring follow-up or actionable items are covered and greater
definitions of labor and management roles in the management of safety events reported
were highlighted. Overall language to improve self-reporting included comprehensive
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annual training that provides knowledge on safety report filing procedures and
accessibility to self-reporting systems.
There were also recommendations to provide information as part of self-reporting
programs that delineate actions that warrant punitive actions such as intentional disregard
for safety and sabotage. To improve labor-management relations, financial reward for
safety (reporting), better communication, and training was suggested. A lead-by-example
option to experience issues firsthand was suggested, by having management be involved
with the frontline operations as well.
In terms of study limitations, the small sample size and skewness towards pilots
may have impacted the results and a future study with a relatively bigger and wellstratified sample is recommended to update the findings of this study. The COVID-19
pandemic and the subsequent adverse airline performance and personnel issues may also
have impacted the results of this survey. A future study may also include other
stakeholders in aviation such as Part 135 operators and Air Traffic Management
personnel in the U.S to assess the study variables.
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APPENDIX A

Survey Questions
v7. Everyone understands their role in safety
v8 Everyone is accountable for their safety responsibilities
v9 Employees are properly trained for their position
v10 There are punitive actions by management for self-reporting safety issues
v11 There are consequences for intentional violations
v12 People report conditions that exist for an accident to occur
v13 There is clear evidence that employees have a voice in safety
v14 There is a system in place whereby staff can report incidents anonymously
v15 Managers/Supervisors promote safety through leading by example
v16 There is trust between management/supervisors and employees
v17 Our self-reporting policy of safety violations is non-punitive
v18 Management encourages reporting of incidents or safety concerns even if there are
adverse consequences (for the company)
v19, I feel confident that I can file an ASAP or other voluntary safety report without
fear of punitive action by management
v20 My employment contract (union, third party, or nonunion agreement) ensures
protection from punitive action for self-reporting safety violations or unsafe conditions
v21 If language were included in my employment contract providing protections for
self-reporting of safety violations it would improve reporting of safety violations or
incidents?
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APPENDIX B
Exploratory Factor Analysis
Factor

1

v7. Role
v8. Accountable
v9. Trained
v10. Punitive
v11. Consequences
v12. CTEFAATO*
v13. Voice
v14. System
v15. Lead
.630
v16. Trust
.817
v17. Nonpunitive
v18. Encourage_Reporting
.340
v20. CBA_protects
v21. CBA_Language
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.

2
.581
.969
.565

3

4

.580
.439
.519
.768
.389

.777
.551

Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. Rotation converged in 11 iterations.
*Smith, D. (January 21, 2021) TSI Training, Safety Management Systems Oklahoma, City, OK.
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APPENDIX C
Airline Employee Safety Survey

Confidential and Voluntary Survey for Airline Employees: Thank you for your time!
Question Title
1. What is your job role or what was your job role in the airline industry?
Airline Pilot
Airline Dispatcher
Airport Customer Service/Gate Agent
Flight Attendant
Maintenance (Line)
Maintenance (Base)
Meteorologist
Ramp Agent/Station Operations
Contract Maintenance (Station/Field)
Other (please specify)

Question Title
2. How many years have you been employed in the airline industry?

Question Title
3. Are (were) you a member of a Labor Union for your job role in the airline industry?
Yes
No

Question Title
4. What is your current employment status within the airline industry?
Full Employment
Part-time
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Furloughed
Retired
None of the Above

Question Title
5. What type of voluntary safety reporting program does your airline have for your job?
State sponsored reporting program with labor Union representation (ASAP)
State sponsored reporting program but I do not know how it works (ASAP)
Company developed safety reporting program
Unknown
Not required to have a safety reporting program
Other (please specify)

Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements:

6. Everyone understands their role in safety
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neutral/Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree

7. Everyone is accountable for their safety responsibilities
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neutral/Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree
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8. Employees are properly trained for their position
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neutral/Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree

9. There are punitive actions by management for self-reporting safety issues
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neutral/Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree

10. There are consequences for intentional violations
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neutral/Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree

11. People report conditions that exist for an accident to occur
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neutral/Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree
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12. There is clear evidence that employees have a voice in safety
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neutral/Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree

13. There is a system in place whereby staff can report incidents anonymously
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neutral/Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree

14. Managers/Supervisors promote safety through leading by example
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neutral/Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree

15. There is trust between management/supervisors and employees
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neutral/Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree
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16. Our self-reporting policy of safety violations is non-punitive
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neutral/Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree

17. Management encourages reporting of incidents or safety concerns even if there are adverse
consequences (for the company).
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neutral/Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree

18. I feel confident that I can file an ASAP or other voluntary safety report without fear of
punitive action by management.
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neutral/Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree

19. My employment contract (union, third party, or nonunion agreement) ensures protection from
punitive action for self-reporting safety violations or unsafe conditions.
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neutral/Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
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Strongly Agree

20. If language were included in my employment contract providing protections for self-reporting
of safety violations it would improve reporting of safety violations or incidents?
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neutral/Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree

Airline Employee Safety Survey

21. What language or additions would you suggest for CBA's or employment agreements to
improve confidential safety reporting?

22. What suggestions do you have for the management/labor relationship to be improved to
ensure safety reporting of potential violations?

23. Please feel free to provide any information or share any other comments you have below:
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